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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
CRIMINAL LAW-CONTRIBUTING TO THE DELINQUENCY OF MIN-
ORS-ADJUDGMENT OF MINOR AS DELINQUENT AS A PREREQUISITE-
Defendant was convicted of contributing to the delinquency of
children under Act 139 of 1916.1 He appealed the conviction to the
supreme court on a writ of certiorari, alleging that the juvenile
court's judgment was erroneous, since the child had not been con-
victed of delinquency, nor in fact, was she delinquent. Held, that
under certain provisions of Act 139 of 1916, it was not a necessary
element of the misdemeanor of contributing to the delinquency
of children that the child actually be found delinquent and con-
victed thereof. The only requirement being that the parent, tu-
tor, or guardian allowed the child to perform acts which under
ordinary circumstances would tend to cause him to become de-
linquent. State v. Scallan, 10 So. (2d) 885 (La. 1942).
The above question, as to whether a juvenile must actually
be proved delinquent, before an adult can be convicted of con-.
tributing to his delinquency, has often been contested in Louisi-
ana and in other jurisdictions. The crime itself is one which was
unknown at common law;2 but most states have enacted statutes
making it punishable3 These statutes, as interpreted judicially,
may be broadly divided into two groups. First, those which re-
quire as a necessary element of the crime that the juvenile has
actually become delinquent,4 although in some states this need
not be proven by a separate suit for that purpose prior to the
trial for the criminal act, but may be established as a fact at the
trial itself.5 And second, those which do not require, as an ele-
ment of the crime, that the conduct of the accused actually caused
the child to become delinquent, but rather that it had the effect
1. Dart's Crim .Stats. (1932) § 929: "Any parent, guardian, or other per-
son having the custody or control of a child under the age of seventeen years
... who permits such child . . . to enter any place where the morals of such
child may be corrupted, endangered, or depraved, or may likely be impaired
... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be
fined not more than two hundred dollars, or be imprisoned in the parish jail
or prison for not more than one year, or both, in the discretion of the court."
2. State v. Williams, 73 Wash. 678, 132 Pac. 415 (1913).
3. California: Edgington v. Superior Court of Yolo County, .18 Cal. App.
739, 124 Pac. 450, 128 Pac. 338 (1912); People v. Oliver, 29 Cal. App. 576, 156
Pac. 1005 (1916); People v. DeLeon, 35 Cal. App. 467, 170 Pac. 173 (1917);
People v. Young, 44 Cal. App. 279, 186 Pac. 383 (1919); Idaho: State v. Drury,
25 Idaho 787, 139 Pac. 1129 (1914); Illinois: People v. Calkins, 291 Ill. 317, 126
N.E. 200 (1920); Indiana: Tullis v. Shaw, 169 Ind. 662, 83 N.E. 376 (1908);
Ohio: Walton v. State, 19 Ohio 452, 3 Ohio App. 97 (1914); Oregon: State v.
Eisen, 53 Ore. 297, 99 Pac. 282, 100 Pac. 257 (1909).
4. People v. Pierro, 17 Cal. App. 741, 121 Pac. 689 (1911).
5. State v. Williams, 73 Wash. 678, 132 Pac. 415 (1913). Accord: State v.
Ramey, 173 La. 478, 137 So. 859 (1931).
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of tendering and encouraging him to become suchY These stat-
utes may be further classified into those which require that the
accused actually stand in the position of loco parentis;7 and those,
more general in scope, which punish anyone who contributes to
the minor's delinquency." In Louisiana, after adopting Act 139 of
1916, requiring that the accused actually stand in loco parentis,
the legislature two years later adopted a second statute punish-
ing anyone, other than parents, guardians, or persons having the
custody of a child (in which case Act 139 of 1916 still applied),
who contributed to the child's delinquency."
Due to the fact that so few convictions of this nature are ap-
pealed from the juvenile courts, or the district courts sitting as
juvenile courts, Louisiana's position as to the necessity of the
juvenile being actually delinquent is not too clearly settled."0
However, there are a few cases which indicate Louisiana's posi-
tion. In State v. Ramey1 the defendant was convicted and ap-
pealed, alleging error in that the child was not declared delin-
quent prior to his conviction. The court held that under Act 169
of 1918 it is not always necessary that the minor be adjudged
delinquent, the only requirement in such an instance being that
the child's conduct brought him under the definition of a delin-
quent child as defined by Section 6 of Act 83 of 1921.12 And again,
in State v. Lewis,' , the court cited State v. Ramey and held that
it was not a prerequisite to conviction for the crime to charge and
prove the juvenile a delinquent child where his act amounted to
delinquency as defined by statute. Thus these two decisions seem
to have definitely settled that under Act 169 of 1918 (and in all
probability, under Act 139 of 1916), where the juvenile's conduct
amounts to delinquency as defined by Act 83 of 1921, it is not a
prerequisite to conviction of the adult that the child actually be
adjudged delinquent in a separate suit for that purpose. But, as
the principal case clearly indicates, under Act 139 of 1916 there
were instances, where the child was neither a delinquent as de-
6. State v. Dunn, 53 Ore. 304, 99 Pac. 278, 100 Pac. 258 (1909).
7. People v. Lee, 266 Ill. 148, 107 N.E. 112 (1914).
8. State v. Plastino, 67 Wash. 374, 121 Pac. 851 (1912).
9. La. Act 169 of 1918 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 930].
10. Under La. Acts 139 of 1916 and 169 of 1918 there was no doubt that
if the child was adjudged delinquent, then any adult who contributed to his
becoming delinquent could be punished.
11. 173 La. 478, 137 So. 859 (1931).
12. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1684. In Caddo Parish, La. Act 30 of 1924, § 10
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1699]. In Orleans Parish, La. Act 126 of 1921, § 4
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1712].
13. 183 La. 823, 165 So. 1 (1935).
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fined by statute nor could he have been adjudged delinquent in a
suit for that purpose, in which the adult could be convicted.1' Act
169 of 1918 does not extend this far.
A question which might have arisen under these two statutes,
but as far as can be found, never arose, is whether lack of knowl-
edge of the child's age may be used as a defense. In some com-
mon law jurisdictions this is held to be such.15 In Louisiana, how-
ever, it would seem otherwise from the decision of State v. Dier-
lamm.16 The opinion of the court in this case, although pertaining
to the crime of carnal knowledge of a juvenile, 17 appears equally
applicable to any similar criminal statute enacted for the protec-
tion of minors.
With the adoption of the new Criminal Code, Acts 139 of
1916 and 169 of 1918 were repealed, 8 and a new article adopted:
The new single article serves the purpose of the prior two statutes
by extending its coverage to anyone contributing to the minor's
delinquency. In scope it is somewhat limited as compared to the
prior statutes, omitting several acts which formerly were punish-
able. It definitely settles what doubt might have existed under
the old statutes as to the matter of knowledge of the child's age,
and specifically states that lack of such knowledge shall not be a
defense. It also appears to clear up the question of whether the
child must first be declared delinquent before conviction of the
crime may be had. It defines the crime as "the intentional en-
ticing, aiding, or permitting, by anyone over the age of seventeen,
of any child under the age of seventeen [and then lists nine pun-
ishable acts]." From the phrasing of the article it can be seen that
it punishes the acts without making any mention of a require-
ment that the child be adjudged or rendered delinquent.19 There-
14. "Or who omits to exercise reasonable diligence in the control of such
child to prevent such child from becoming guilty of delinquency . . .or who
permits such child .. . to enter any place where the morals of such child
may be corrupted, endangered or depraved."
15. Gottlieb v. Commonwealth, 126 Va.'807, 101 S.E. 872 (1920).
16. 189 La. 544, 180 So. 135 (1938). In this case the defendant upon con-
viction brought error on the ground that the trial judge refused to instruct
the jury that it must be shown that he knew the minor to be under the age
of lawful consent. The supreme court, in upholding the trial judge's refusal,
said: "Even in criminal law, when a statute makes an act indictable with-
out regard to guilty knowledge, then ignorance of fact, although sincere, is
no defense, and the intent with which the act is done is of no consequence."
17. La. Act 192 of 1912 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 1142], superseded by
Art. 80, La. Crim. Code.
18. Art. 92, La. Crim. Code.
19. Article 93 of the new Criminal Code punishes Intentional neglect of
the minor, which was formerly punishable with contributing to delinquency
of minors, under Acts 139 of 1916 and 169 of 1918.
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fore, it seems that the only logical interpretation of the article is
that the drafters of the Code intended to omit that requirement.
If an additional argument is needed, a review of the decisions
under the old statute2 0 will lend force to the above interpretation
of the new Article 92.
B.R.D.
INSURANCE-OPTIONAL RIGHT OF INSURER UNDER THE LOUISIANA
NON-FORFEITURE STATUTE--Action by beneficiary to recover face
value of a policy which lapsed due to nonpayment of premiums
after being in existence for more than three years. The policy
contained a stipulation providing for automatic paid-up insurance
in the event of lapse for nonpayment of premiums. Defendant
contends that in accordance with the authority granted it by Act
57 of 1932, and because of a stipulation contained in the policy
providing for automatic paid-up insurance in the event of lapse
for nonpayment of premiums, the maximum amount of defend-
ant's liability was the paid-up insurance value of said policy.
Held, the insurer cannot insert in their policies conditions requir-
ing the insured to exercise his option before the policy lapses.
The insurer's right granted by statute to apply the reserve fund
is a conditional right. The policy not having granted the insured
an option as required by Act 193 of 1906, as amended by Act 57
of 1932, the secondary optional right of the insurer never came
into existence. Edwards v. National Life & Accident Insurance
Company, Incorporated, 11 So. (2d) 125 (La. 1942).
"The delinquent policyholder has no inherent right to the
reserve value of his policy. . . .Hence any claim made by the
insured to paid-up or extended insurance must necessarily be
based upon an agreement or a statute according to him such a
right."' Statutes giving the insured certain rights to the reserve
for the purpose of this note will be classified into five categories.
First, the minority group of non-forfeiture statutes provide that
in the event of a default in payment of premiums, the reserve
shall be applied in the one form which is stipulated in the stat-
ute.2 The better constructed non-forfeiture statutes compose the
20. State v. Ramey, 173 La. 478, 137 So. 859 (1931); State v. Lewis, 183 La.
823, 165 So. 1 (1935).
1. Vance, Handbook of the Law of Insurance (2 ed. 1930) 302, § 88.
2. Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) 998, § 133, provides that, on forfeiture of a life
policy for nonpayment of premiums after it has been in force three full
1943]
